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Reflected Appraisal Through a 21st Century Looking Glass
The concept of reflected appraisal—also known as reflected self-appraisal or the lookingglass self—refers to the processes by which peoples' self-views are influenced by their
perceptions of how others view them. 1 Reflected appraisal is reflected in the metaphor that
people use others as a mirror, i.e. looking glass, for judging themselves, and also in the sense that
others' judgments are reflected in self-judgments. The concept refers simultaneously to Person
A's self-appraisal and Person A's appraisal of Person B's appraisal of Person A. These appraisals
exert reciprocal influence: Self-views affect judgments of others' views, and judgments of others'
views affect self-views. In short, reflected appraisal can be viewed as a cycle of mutually
influential judgments. 2
Psychologists, sociologists, and communication scholars have routinely acknowledged
the role of reflected appraisal in self-concept development since James (1890), Cooley (1902),
and Mead (1934) articulated its importance. The volume of published studies offering direct or
indirect evidence for reflected appraisal is overwhelming. Mere correlation between the content
of self-views held and social feedback received could be construed as evidence for reflected
appraisal, but one need not rely on correlational data to conclude that perceptions of others'
appraisals can influence self-perception. Many experiments that have randomly assigned
participants to receive social feedback have reported whether self-appraisals changed as a result
of such feedback, and a subset of these studies also report perceptions of others' perspectives that
may have mediated feedback-induced self-concept change. Such sources of reflected appraisal
evidence are often modestly framed as manipulation checks designed to show that feedback had
the intended impact. We assume that the volume of published studies offering direct or indirect
evidence for reflected appraisal is considerably larger than the already impressive number of
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studies that explicitly address reflected appraisal, because researchers now have little incentive to
call attention to basic replications of reflected appraisal phenomena that have long been taken for
granted.
Reviews of reflected appraisal research have previously been published (e.g., Felson,
1993; Lundgren, 2004; Shrauger & Schoeneman, 1979; Tice & Wallace, 2003), but most have
either been sidebars in papers written to address other issues or have focused narrowly on one
subcomponent of reflected appraisal. For this chapter, we sought to extend the reflected appraisal
literature by offering an up-to-date review of empirical evidence relevant to each stage of the
reflected appraisal cycle. We start by analyzing people's impressions of others' impressions of
them, then examine how impressions of others influence self-views. We conclude by
highlighting challenges faced by reflected appraisal researchers and considering how new
technology is changing the study and nature of reflected appraisal.
Perceptions of Others' Appraisals
The stage of reflected appraisal in which people form subjective impressions of others'
views of them is commonly called metaperception. 3 When discussing the psychological
consequences of reflected appraisal, one is obliged to clarify that the process is driven by the
perception of others' views, which may or may not resemble the reality of others' views. The
theme of disconnection between metaperception and reality has been revisited often in reflected
appraisal research (e.g., Shrauger & Schoeneman, 1979). Myriad factors can undermine
individuals' empathic accuracy, i.e., their ability to correctly imagine others' perspectives (Ickes,
1997). Metaperception usually requires making inferences based on an incomplete, ambiguous
set of cues. Assessing how one is viewed by other people is easy only to the extent that others
communicate their perspective clearly, directly, and honestly. Of course, people generally avoid
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revealing the details of their appraisals to the people they appraise, especially if the details could
be hurtful or offensive (Blumberg, 1972; DePaulo & Bell, 1996).
The mere availability of cues that convey the perspective of another does not guarantee
that person perceivers will use them (O'Conner & Dyce, 1993). One explanation relates to
individuals' limited ability and motivation to attend to and reflect upon relevant available
information about other people. For example, the act of intentionally managing the impression
one presents to others diverts attention that could otherwise be focused on noting others'
responses (e.g., Baumeister, Hutton, & Tice, 1989). Furthermore, the process of actively trying
to understand others can encourage top-down information processing, causing tunnel vision (e.g.,
Gilbert, Jones, & Pelham, 1987; Gilbert & Krull, 1988). Even when people receive and pay
attention to concrete evidence about others' views of them, they may still reject or minimize the
importance of this information if it conflicts with their expectations (e.g., Jones, 1986) and
preferences (e.g., Sanitioso & Wlodarski, 2004).
Self-appraisals steer metaperceptions
To convey the difficulty of deducing others’ views, Shrauger and Shoeneman (1979)
adopted the phrase "through a looking glass darkly" to emphasize the opaqueness of the looking
glass. However, as Murray, Holmes, MacDonald, and Ellsworth (1998) recognized, the same
phrase could also be used to describe the excessive pessimism that characterizes some people's
metaperceptions. Consistent with self-consistency models of self-evaluation, individuals with
chronically low or insecure self-esteem sometimes struggle to accept evidence that others really
do think well of them (e.g., Campbell, Simpson, Boldry, & Kashy, 2005; Lemay & Dudley,
2009; McNulty, 2008; Murray, Holmes, Griffin, Bellavia, & Rose, 2001). As Murray, Rose,
Bellavia, Holmes, and Kusche (2002) put it, people with low self-esteem are more likely to
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"make mountains out of molehills" by assuming that minor criticisms from others signal overall
negative appraisals. Moreover, the social norm of communicating compliments while
withholding criticism magnifies the impact of critical feedback that does get expressed and can
even lead people to perceive neutral social feedback as negative (e.g., Leary, Haupt, Strausser, &
Chokel, 1998).
Still, people who underestimate the positivity of others' impressions of them seem to be
more the exception than the rule. The self-enhancement bias that pervades self-evaluations (e.g.,
see research on optimistic bias and better-than-average effects described in Alicke’s chapter in
this volume) is also evident in metaperceptions—especially when the risk of encountering
disconfirming evidence is minimal (Preuss & Alicke, 2009). Most people have positive overall
self-esteem (Baumeister, Tice, & Hutton, 1989) and are prone to self-flattering interpretations of
social feedback (see review by Baumeister, 1998). For example, Murray and colleagues showed
that high self-esteem individuals respond to esteem-threatening events by increasing their
confidence in others' positive views of them (Murray, Griffin, Rose, & Bellavia, 2003; Murray et
al., 1998). Even unbiased person perceivers should tend to overestimate others' opinion of them
simply because positive appraisals are more commonly expressed than negative appraisals
(DePaulo & Bell, 1996).
The evidence just presented indicates that existing self-views affect interpretation of
information regarding others' views, but sometimes self-views are the primary or only source of
metaperceptions, not merely a filter. An impressive body of evidence indicates that
metaperception, like other categories of social judgment, often relies more on egocentric
projections of self-views than on assessments of external information (see reviews by Felson,
1993; Krueger, 1998; 2007). Self-views can dominate judgments of others for several reasons.
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Social cognition research has repeatedly demonstrated that chronically accessible self-views
influence social judgments automatically and unconsciously (see review by Baldwin, 1992).
Epley, Keysar, VanBoven, and Gilovich (2004) concluded that basing judgments of others' views
on self-views constitutes the first stage of the perspective taking process—an initial default
judgment that can be overridden only if circumstances allow and encourage more thorough
information processing. Mere awareness of one's own views can interfere with one's ability to
correctly gauge others' perspectives (Chambers, Epley, Savitsky, & Windschitl, 2008). Moreover,
people can justify interjecting self-views into judgments of others' views because they assume
that others share their views. The false consensus effect describes the tendency for people to
overestimate the overlap between their views and those of others (Marks & Miller, 1987; Ross,
Greene, & House, 1977). People are also prone to the illusion of transparency—overestimating
the extent to which their feelings are evident to others (Gilovich, Savitsky, & Medvec, 1998),
especially if they feel self-conscious (Vorauer & Ross, 1999).
Although the impact of self-views on metaperceptions is typically large, it is not
inevitable. People are less likely to assume that another person shares their views when the other
person is noticeably different from them (Kenny & DePaulo, 1993), an outgroup member
(Clement & Krueger, 2002; Frey & Tropp, 2006), or someone who is not emotionally close
(Ames, 2004a, b). People are also more apt to take a systematic, bottom-up approach to evidence
analysis in judging other people’s views of them, rather than relying on self-views or other
judgment heuristics, if they think the judgment is relevant to their personal future (Kaplan,
Santuzzi, & Ruscher, 2009). In general, if information about others' views is salient and
unambiguous, people are more likely to use it when assessing others, rather than to rely only on
self-views or other heuristics (e.g., Baron, Albright, & Malloy, 1995; Jussim, Soffin, Brown, Ley,
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& Kohlhepp, 1992). Perspective-taking aids can also reduce self-projection in metaperception:
Albright and Malloy (1999) showed that participants' metaperception accuracy improved if they
were first shown a videotape of their own behavior.
Metaperception accuracy
In the past 25 years, measurement and statistical innovations have allowed researchers to
assess metaperception accuracy with more sophistication. In their seminal review of this topic,
Kenny and DePaulo (1993) concluded that individuals can judge how people in general view
them with reasonable accuracy, but they overestimate the uniformity of others' views because
they cannot accurately distinguish the perspectives of specific other people. This perspective fits
well with the notion of the "generalized other" proposed by Mead (1934). The generalized other
concept assumes that reflected appraisal processes are insensitive to differences between others'
appraisals—other people get lumped together into a collective whole, so it does not matter
whether the metaperceptions driving the reflected appraisal process are judgments of the views
of one person or many people (see discussion by Felson, 1989).
More recent studies have confirmed people's ability to recognize how most others view
them, but several have also determined that people are sometimes quite capable of judging the
views of specific others (e.g., Carlson & Furr, 2009; Levesque, 1997; Oltmanns, Gleason,
Klonsky, & Turkheimer, 2005). At first glance, the notion that metaperception is often
reasonably accurate (see Jussim, 1993; Jussim, Harber, Crawford, Cain, & Cohen, 2005 for
endorsements of this perspective) might seem difficult to reconcile with the aforementioned
evidence that multiple factors distort judgments of others' views. To an extent, debates about
metaperception accuracy boil down to different interpretations of the same statistics—a 75%
level of metaperception accuracy could be framed as an impressive or lousy performance.
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Another explanation is that bringing attention to factors that challenge people’s ability to grasp
others’ perspectives suggests that these factors undermine perspective taking more consistently
and to a greater degree that is actually the case. In other words, accuracy in perspective taking
might be typical, but the exceptions are compelling and therefore attract disproportionate
research attention (see discussion by Jussim, 2005). Yet another possibility is that
metaperception accuracy occurs despite people's reliance on self-views for judging others' views.
Although people exaggerate the extent of overlap between views of themselves and
others, one could argue that people's social views on the whole tend to be more similar than
different, at least regarding ingroup-relevant topics. This makes sense, because an individual's
self-views are partly based on the same behavior and outcomes that determine others' views of
that individual (Albright, Forest, & Reiseter, 2001; Chambers et al., 2008; Malloy, Albright, &
Scarpati, 2007). If a person is viewed similarly by that person and by others, the same
metaperceptions should result from either pure projections of self-views or from unbiased
perspective taking. Metaperception accuracy should presumably be relatively high for judgments
of self-dimensions that are tied to discrete, observable actions (e.g., basketball free-throw skill),
and relatively low for more abstract self-dimensions (e.g., basketball court awareness).
Considering the challenges involved in deciphering others' perspectives, using one's own
perspective to estimate other people's perceptions may sometimes yield more reliably accurate
judgments than trying to exercise empathy and carefully analyze external evidence (e.g.,
DiDinato, Ullrich, & Krueger, 2011); however, this argument is challenged by evidence that
people can be surprisingly clueless about their own strengths and weaknesses (Dunning, 2005).
In summary, research demonstrates that people's judgments of how others view them
derive, at least in part, from extrapolation and imposition of existing self-views. Injecting one’s
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own self-views into judgments of how one is viewed by others can compromise the accuracy of
these judgments, yet people's assessments of how others view them seem to be fairly accurate
despite or perhaps even because of this egocentrism. In the next section, we shift from examining
how people's self-views influence metaperceptions to examining how people's self-views are
influenced by metaperceptions.
Effects of Metaperception on Self-perception
Self-concept change resulting from reflected appraisal may entail a fundamental shift in
one's global self-appraisal, or it could be restricted to a minor, trivial subcomponent of the selfconcept. The point that self-appraisals can be influenced by perceptions of others' appraisals may
seem obvious, 4 but the extent of this influence was probably underappreciated before Leary and
colleagues introduced sociometer theory (Leary & Baumeister, 2000; Leary, Tambor, Terdal, &
Downs, 1995). Sociometer theory offers a convincing explanation for why self-views are so
susceptible to influence from perceptions of others' evaluations: People care about others' views
because their good or bad feelings about themselves directly depend on how they think others
feel about them. Individuals share a fundamental need for assurance of connection with people
who accept them (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). The sociometer model asserts that self-esteem is
essentially an index of perceived social acceptance. Even anticipating change to one's social
acceptance status impacts self-appraisal (Leary et al., 1995). Self-esteem is particularly sensitive
to negative metaperceptions that threaten minimum standards for belongingness; positive
metaperceptions that merely reinforce one's sense of being accepted have relatively less impact
on self-esteem (Leary et al., 1995; see Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001;
Fenigstein, 1979 for more confirmation that negative social feedback packs more punch than
positive feedback). 5
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The process by which metaperceptions become integrated into one's self-concept is
mostly automatic (for reviews, see Chen, Boucher, & Tapias, 2006; Higgins & Pittman, 2008).
Baldwin, Carrell, and Lopez (1990) demonstrated this fact by showing that priming students to
think about authority figures associated with disapproval (the Pope or the department chair)
caused their self-views to become more negative. Additional evidence can be drawn from Shah's
(2003a, b) finding that one person's exposure to other people's views about the goals that person
should pursue caused that person's goals to shift automatically to fit other people's perspectives.
Effects of exposure to others' appraisals extend beyond the window of time in which exposure
occurred. For example, Weisbuch, Sinclair, Skorinko, and Eccleston (2009) showed that
encountering an experimenter wearing a t-shirt promoting tolerance of different body sizes led
female participants to experience higher state self-esteem when interacting with this
experimenter (now wearing a message-free shirt) one week later.
The same self-affirmation and self-enhancement biases that guide the formation of
metaperceptions are also evident in the integration of metaperceptions into self-views. People
embrace and assimilate social feedback into self-views more rapidly if the feedback is consistent
with their existing self-views and the implications are positive (e.g., Shrauger, 1975). People also
selectively recall metaperception details that match or bolster preferred self-views (e.g.,
Sanitioso & Wlodarski, 2004). Swann, Bosson, and Pelham (2002) found that people can even
expand the boundaries of their self-concepts to incorporate desirable social feedback. Choice of
social environment provides a good example of how individuals can exert control over reflected
appraisal outcomes. People want to feel good, or at least not feel bad, about themselves, so they
choose to spend time with people who reinforce their current or ideal self-appraisals (e.g.,
McNulty & Swann, 1994; Swann & Read, 1981). Although much of the bias observed in
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reflected appraisal is best characterized as automatic and passive, people also play an active role
in shaping the reflected appraisal process, and to some degree they do so with awareness and
intention.
Moderators of and mediators of metaperception internalization
By definition, demonstrations of reflected appraisal effects highlight the instability and
conditionality of people's self-appraisals. Reflected appraisal susceptibility indicates a selfconcept that is not fully formed, or at least not held with confidence. In general, research has
linked self-concept instability and contingency with more psychological problems than benefits
(e.g., Crocker, Luhtanen, & Sommers, 2004; Kernis, Paradise, Whitaker, Wheatman, & Goldman,
2000). The same could be said for the psychological correlates of sensitivity to reflected
appraisal. Perceptions of others' appraisals exert more influence on the self-appraisals of people
who have low self-esteem (e.g., Murray, Holmes, & Griffin, 1996), anxious avoidant attachment
(e.g., Srivastava & Beer, 2005), a record of low achievement, (e.g., Madon, Jussim, & Eccles,
1997), or stigmatized personal features (e.g., Cioffi, 2000; Khanna, 2010; Santuzzi & Ruscher,
2002). The tendency for individuals with low self-esteem to make mountains out of molehills
also applies to their response to critical social feedback (Murray et al., 2002). Compared to
people with high self-esteem, people with low self-esteem have more difficulty confining the
self-evaluative consequences of specific criticism to the narrow facets of self directly implicated
by the feedback. Unfortunately, the people whose self-esteem fluctuates most dramatically with
perceived social approval also tend to be evaluated less favorably by others (Harter, Stocker, &
Robinson, 1996).
Cultural differences in the degree to which people’s self-concepts are affected by
reflected appraisal have been observed, most notably in comparisons between collectivistic East
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Asian cultures and individualistic Western cultures. Collectivism prioritizes interconnections
between oneself and others, and Suh (2007) confirmed that self-views of East Asians are more
contingent on perceptions of others' appraisals than self-views of individuals from Western
cultures. In Suh's words, the "perspective of others very often becomes the default position of the
East Asian self" (p. 1327). This conclusion dovetails with research showing that the Chinese are
much better at perspective taking than Americans (Wu & Keysar, 2007). Heine, Takemoto,
Moskalenko, Lasaleta, and Henrich (2008) found that Japanese participants were insensitive to
the presence of a mirror that caused North American participants to become more self-aware, an
outcome suggesting that North Americans are less accustomed to considering how they appear to
others. People display more confidence in other people's ability to judge them if they live in East
Asian cultures (Tafarodi, Lo, Yamaguchi, Lee, & Katsura, 2004) or report attitudes reflecting a
collectivistic orientation (Vorauer & Cameron, 2002). This connection between individualism
and the belief that others cannot accurately judge may help to explain the comparatively high
levels of self-esteem found in Western cultures: Individualistic people should find it easier to
rationalize their rejection of undesired social feedback.
Reflected appraisal outcomes partly depend on one’s perception of the other person’s
characteristics. As Cooley (1902) proposed, perceptions of another person's appraisal are more
likely to become assimilated into the self-concept if the other person is considered relevant,
important, valued, desired, and an ingroup member (e.g., Cast, Stets, & Burke, 1999; Rosenberg,
1973; Sinclair, Huntsinger, Skorinko, & Hardin, 2005; Turner & Onorato, 1999). Sinclair et al.
(2005) found that pondering other people's appraisals could even push self-views in the opposite
direction of others' appraisals if the other people were undesirable relationship partners. However,
not all evidence neatly corresponds with the principle that reflected appraisals of important
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others matter more. Harter (1999) confirmed that self-appraisals of children are most affected by
perceived appraisals of their parents, but her finding that teens and adults are more affected by
the appraisals of peers than family members or their closest friends is harder to square with other
evidence regarding effects of metaperception target importance. Harter explained this apparent
contradiction by speculating that people view the appraisals of their closest family and friends as
biased and therefore less credible.
Metaperceptions can influence self-views directly or they can alter self-views indirectly
by inducing behavior change. People adjust their behavior, whether strategically or
unintentionally, in response to their sense of how others currently view them or in response to
their expectations for how others will view them after observing the behavior. People's
perceptions of others' appraisals of their capabilities automatically affect their goal setting,
performance, and responses to performance outcomes (Shah, 2003a, b). The impact of people's
metaperceptions on their behavior is best exemplified by research on self-fulfilling prophecy and
stereotype threat. Self-fulfilling prophecy describes how receiving information about others'
expectations of them can cause people to behave in a manner that confirms others' expectations
(see reviews by Jussim & Harber, 2005; Rosenthal & Rubin, 1978). Stereotype threat refers to
fear of confirming negative stereotypes about the abilities of one’s group—a fear that often
undermines performance, thus confirming the stereotype (see review by Schmader, Johns, &
Forbes, 2008). Explanations of self-fulfilling prophecy generally emphasize that internalization
of others' expectancies precedes expectancy-confirming behavior, which reinforces the
internalization process. In contrast, the stereotype threat literature emphasizes that when negative
stereotypes regarding the capabilities of some group are made salient, members of that group
generally underachieve whether they accept the validity of the stereotype or not. 6
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The behavior that metaperceptions influence can affect self-appraisals through selfperception or by causing metaperceptions to change. Self-perception, the process by which one’s
self-appraisals adjust according to the implications of one's own behavior, can partly be
explained by people's preference for self-consistency, but this explanation alone cannot account
for evidence that people are more likely to internalize their behavior when it was also observed
by other people (Kelly & Rodriguez, 2006; Schlenker, Dlugolecki, & Doherty, 1994; Tice, 1992).
People often behave in ways that conflict with personal attitudes and values, but public
commitment to such behavior dramatically increases the consequences for their self-concept—
especially if the audience is perceived to have a personal interest in the behavior (Harter, 1999;
Pasupathi & Rich, 2005). People have reason to recognize or at least assume that observers tend
to attribute behavior to the stable personal qualities of the individual engaging in the behavior,
rather than viewing the behavior as an abberation or as the product of forces outside of the
individual (see review by Gilbert & Malone, 1995). Indeed, when people disclose unflattering
personal information or publicly humiliate themselves, they usually overestimate the negative
impact on others’ views of them (e.g., Gromet & Pronin, 2009). Therefore, engaging in
uncharacteristic behavior may cause people to amend their judgment of an observer’s appraisal
of them, which may in turn cause them to change their self-views. In short, metaperception can
shape behavior, which in turn can shape metaperception.
The real-world consequences of the connections between metaperceptions and behavior,
as well as the outcomes of self-appraisals, could potentially be profound. For example, Murray
and colleagues have shown that the actions of people who view their partners with rose colored
glasses elevate their partner's self-appraisals, which in turn promotes behavior worthy of positive
appraisal (e.g., Murray et al., 1996). Murray's findings have been extended by research on the
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Michelangelo effect (Drigotas, Rusbult, Wieselquist, & Whitton, 1999), which describes the
process by which close relationship partners shape each other's behavior and self-appraisals
toward desired ideals. The Michelangelo effect essentially highlights a form of self-fulfilling
prophecy—treating others as if they possessed the traits that you wished they had actually leads
others to feel that they possess those traits and to engage in behavior consistent with the desired
traits.
Kelly's (2000) research on secret disclosure in psychotherapy provides another example
of how reflected appraisal effects can be mediated by people’s behavior. Kelly's work suggests
that people routinely withhold shameful secrets from their therapist in order to project a more
positive self-image. By restricting negative self-disclosure, people can more easily accept that
their therapist truly holds them in high regard and has positive expectations for their future (see
also Lemay & Clark, 2008). Although hiding personal information from others has been linked
with negative psychological outcomes in some contexts (e.g., Uysal, Lin, & Knee, 2010), Kelly
(2000) concluded that downsides of avoiding full self-disclosure in therapy may be offset by
advantages associated with people’s ability to internalize their positive self-presentation and their
perception of being viewed positively by their therapist.
In summary, research confirms that metaperceptions change self-views directly or by
inducing behavior that people internalize. When self-views change, the cycle of reflected
appraisal repeats: Change in self-appraisal is likely to produce change in people's
metaperceptions.
Research Challenges and Opportunities
Studying reflected appraisal presents several challenges. Perhaps the biggest is the fact
that reflected appraisal is not one but rather an interlocking series of processes (see Figure 1). To
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date, most of the empirical evidence relevant to reflected appraisal has emerged from studies
designed to test hypotheses relevant to a single component of reflected appraisal. Capturing the
nuances of each element of the reflected appraisal cycle for all participants in a single study is
impractical, if not implausible, but the lack of such studies leaves open the possibility that the
reality of reflected appraisal as a whole could be different than the sum of evidence from studies
addressing narrow slices of reflected appraisal would indicate.
Reflected appraisal researchers also face methodological challenges in trying to
distinguish between competing explanations for outcomes observed. For example, as discussed
earlier, mere correspondence between self-appraisals and metaperceptions could reflect
judgments of oneself influencing judgments of others, judgments of others influencing
judgments of oneself, or independent judgments of oneself and others. Another challenge is
distinguishing the influence of others' real or perceived appraisals on self-appraisal from selfbroadcasting—the influence of self-appraisal on others' appraisals (see discussions by Felson,
1993; Kenny & DePaulo, 1993; Srivastava & Beer, 2005). Moreover, it is not always easy to
isolate reflected appraisal effects from less complex, more direct sources of social influence such
as social comparison, mimicry (e.g., Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001), and perceived self-other
overlap (e.g., Aron, Aron, Tudor, & Nelson, 1991).
The fact that multiple mechanisms can account for the impact of one's social environment
on self-views raises the question of whether reflected appraisal plays a relatively major or minor
role when compared with alternative forms of social influence. Sedikides and Skowronski (1995)
determined that social comparisons influenced self-appraisals more than reflected appraisal, but
the reality of reflected appraisal has never really been challenged, at least not when reflected
appraisal definitions specify that subjective perceptions of others drive the process. People seem
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to believe that reflected appraisal is an important factor in their self-appraisals (Harter et al.,
1996). In recent years, some businesses have begun trying to increase their employees'
productivity and psychological health through the use of reflected appraisal interventions such as
the "360 degree exercise" or the "reflected best self exercise" that encourage participants to
understand their strengths by viewing themselves through the perspective of their peers (e.g.,
Roberts, Dutton, Spreitzer, Heaphy, & Quinn, 2005).
It may be a cliché to note that rapidly improving neuroscience techniques hold high
promise for enhancing knowledge of psychological processes, but neuroscience has already
advanced reflected appraisal research. An examination of the neurological underpinnings of
reflected appraisal is beyond the scope of this chapter, but a study by Pfeifer et al. (2009) offers
an example of how neuroscience can help. Prior research had established that teens were
sensitive to reflected appraisal (e.g., Harter et al., 1996), but had not directly compared reflected
appraisal for teens and adults. Pfeifer et al. used functional magnetic resonance imaging to probe
the brain activity of adult and adolescent samples during a self-reflection task. They found that
teen brains showed significantly more activity than adult brains in the area at the intersection of
the inferior parietal lobule and posterior superior temporal gyrus—a brain region that has been
linked with third-person perspective-taking. This evidence allowed Pfeifer et al. to conclude that
reflected appraisal does indeed affect the self-appraisals of adolescents more than adults.
Internet-mediated reflected appraisal
Having established that technology innovations can benefit the study of reflected
appraisal, we now consider the intriguing possibility that one relatively new technology—the
internet—has already significantly changed reflected appraisal processes and outcomes. For the
first time in history, face-to-face interaction now is not necessarily the dominant means by which
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people assess and are assessed by others (Zhao, 2006). The telephone reduced people's reliance
on face-to-face communication, but the emergence of the internet has truly been a game changer
for social interaction. People now routinely use computers to present themselves and provide
feedback to others via personal webpages, e-mail, and—to an increasing degree—social
networking sites. In 2010, Americans were spending a greater percentage of internet time using
social networking sites and blogs than e-mail (23% vs. 8%; Nielsen, 2010). The Pew Research
Center reported that nearly three-quarters of the teens and young adults in the world with internet
access were using social networking sites in 2009 (Lenhart, Purcell, Smith, & Zickuhr, 2010) . It
also found that 55% of adults aged 18-25 visited social networking sites at least once a day
(Taylor & Keeter, 2010). Researchers have not had enough time to fully grasp the psychological
consequences of the movement toward electronic social networking (partly because the favored
mode of internet communication keeps changing), but we suspect that Zhao (2005) was on target
in observing that internet communication partners “constitute a distinctive 'looking glass' that
produces a 'digital self' that differs from the self formed offline" (p. 387).
The internet gives people the ability to elicit and gather social feedback around the clock.
Pew Research found that 83% of young adults report always keeping their cellphones (which
today typically offer text message if not internet capability) within arm’s length when sleeping
(Taylor & Keeter, 2010). The increasing extent to which people are connected to social feedback
raises the possibility that people's self-views may be more affected by reflected appraisal now
than they used to be. Before cell phone and internet use became common, researchers
(Schoeneman, 1981; Sedikides & Skowronski, 1995) concluded that self-concept is more
strongly influenced by self-reflection than reflected appraisal. But when these studies were
conducted, self-reflection had less competition. Today, instead of engaging in self-reflection
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during moments of downtime, people may choose instead to call or text a friend, or log on to the
internet.
Different channels of internet communication could have different implications for
reflected appraisal, but we will focus on the compelling example of the Facebook social
networking website. At this point in time, Facebook is by far the most popular option for
computer-mediated communication, with 500 million users (Facebook, 2011). One longitudinal
diary study found that students at an American college spent an average of 30 minutes per day on
Facebook (Pempek, Yermolayeva, & Calvert, 2009). Facebook users create self-descriptive
personal profile homepages that they link to the profiles of other Facebook users (linked users
are called "friends" in Facebook lingo). When Facebook users log on, they can easily view
others' profile updates and new messages sent. Facebook privacy settings allow users to decline
another user's request to be linked as a friend, or to remove a link to an existing friend, but the
fact that Facebook users are commonly linked to more than 200 friends (e.g., Pempek et al.,
2009; Tong, van der Heide, Langwell, & Walther, 2008) hints that users are often not
particularly selective in filtering friend requests.
The flattering Facebook looking glass
Facebook-mediated reflected appraisal probably differs from traditional paths of reflected
appraisal in a number of ways, but in our view the most important difference is that Facebook
appears more likely to promote positive self-appraisals by allowing people to present their
preferred self-image, cultivate a large network of "friends," and dodge signs of others' negative
appraisals. To be sure, like any communication medium, Facebook can and has been used as a
tool for hurting other people. But on the whole, the features and norms of Facebook promote
self-esteem bolstering more than bashing.
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From a self-presentation standpoint, communicating through Facebook rather than during
live interactions allows people more opportunities to subtly craft their public identity through
written communications and by selectively displaying photos and links to favored people, places,
and things (Gonzalez & Hancock, 2011; Zhao, Grasmuch, & Martin, 2008). Internet selfpresentation is rarely blatantly untruthful (e.g., Back et al., 2010; Bargh, McKenna, & Fitzsimons,
2002), but it surely involves selective disclosure. Zhao et al. (2008) found that all of the 60
college student Facebook pages they studied projected a socially desirable identity.
Because Facebook enhances users' ability to project a positive impression of themselves,
they have reason to expect their Facebook friends to think well of them. Although observers who
form impressions of Facebook users discount forms of self-presentation that can easily be
manipulated (Walther, 2009), impression managers are likely to assume that others accept the
details of their self-presentation at face value. This assumption is bolstered by evidence that
people overestimate the degree to which their e-mail messages achieve their communication
goals (Kruger, Epley, Parker, & Ng, 2005), and pre-Facebook evidence that owners of personal
webpages judge that others form more positive impressions of them by viewing their webpage
than through face-to-face interaction (Sherman et al., 2001).
Facebook not only allows people to boost their self-esteem by internalizing the
complimentary self-presentations they craft, but it also gives people chronic access to selfaffirming feedback from others. We have already discussed how social norms in general
encourage people to express their positive views of others but not their criticisms, but internet
social network environments may stack the deck even further in favor of positive social feedback.
One reason why users of Facebook and other social networking sites may expect to receive
flattering social feedback relates to the previously mentioned ability of users to regulate their
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communications to fit their sense of what would be socially appropriate or advantageous. Just as
Facebook users have the power to present themselves to others in ways that emphasize personal
strengths, other users also have the ability to hide their real feelings if expressing them could be
hurtful or counterproductive. In real-time face-to-face interactions, suppressing knee-jerk
expressions of negative feelings (annoyance, disgust, frustration, etc.) toward others or their
actions should be more difficult to manage. Facebook also offers self-esteem maintenance
advantages when users do receive criticism from Facebook friends. Users can escape esteemthreatening feedback by logging off, re-reading more supportive messages posted previously, or
by just removing the offenders from their list of friends, thereby blocking future critical postings.
Three features of Facebook's default settings warrant attention for steering people toward
positive feelings and supportive commentary. First, personal pages automatically display the
total number of Facebook friends one has accumulated, so users receive reassurance of social
acceptance (usually by hundreds of friends) whenever they log on. Second, as Twenge and
Campbell (2009) noted, the Facebook "friends" label confers undeserved status to relationships
between people who often barely know each other. Third, the Facebook default screen includes a
"Like" button that allows people to quickly express their endorsement or appreciation for
comments or content that others post, but the default screen does not include a parallel "Dislike"
or "Hate" button that would make it easier for people to express criticism.
Facebook allows people to simultaneously show off and obtain self-affirming feedback—
two features that narcissists should find especially appealing. Studies by Buffardi and Campbell
(2008) and Mehdizadeh (2010) both found that narcissism predicted quantity of Facebook
activity, and although Bergman, Fearrington, Davenport, and Bergman (2011) did not find the
same relationship, they did show that narcissists were more likely to report using Facebook for
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self-promotion. Buffardi and Campbell proposed that exposure to others' narcissism on
Facebook causes people to present themselves in a more narcissistic manner; perhaps it is no
coincidence that students today are generally more narcissistic than college students in prior
generations (Twenge, Konrath, Foster, Campbell, & Bushman, 2008).
Gonzales and Hancock (2011) gathered the strongest evidence to date for the notion that
Facebook provides a self-flattering looking glass. Their research randomly assigned participants
either to view a mirror, their personal Facebook page, or someone else's Facebook page.
Participants who saw their own Facebook page subsequently had higher self-esteem than
participants assigned to other experiment conditions. Gonzales and Hancock interpreted their
results as evidence of the benefits of being able to personally craft one's Facebook image, but
their results could also be attributed to benefits of exposure to the supportive virtual presence of
Facebook friends.
Although Facebook should be a valuable social resource for people who are sociable by
nature, the people who seem to gain the most from the alternative social interface offered by
Facebook and other internet social networking options are those who have the most trouble
interacting with people in face-to-face meetings. All people may benefit from connections with
accepting others, but some people struggle to overcome fears related to social exposure and
interaction. Individuals who are socially anxious, shy, or lack self-esteem tend to feel more
comfortable engaging with others through an internet environment that allows them to control
their self-presentation more easily without being overwhelmed by having to simultaneously
grasp and respond to the complex interpersonal cues exchanged in face-to-face interactions (e.g.,
Baker & Oswald, 2010; Ellison, Steinfield, & Lampe, 2007; Joinson, 2004). 7
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Of course, social networking does not guarantee self-esteem advantages. The Facebook
norm of socially supportive feedback probably does not extend to the minority of users whose
self-presentations violate standards of social appropriateness. Also, true masters of the art of
face-to-face interaction have less to gain from the movement toward internet-based forms of
communication. In some cases, self-esteem benefits of reflected appraisal via Facebook may be
cancelled out by the upward comparison threats posed by exposure to seemingly thriving
Facebook friends (e.g., Jordan et al., 2011).
Closing thoughts
When compared to the history of research on some other topics relevant to self and
identity, the reflected appraisal literature is relatively uncontentious. Early accounts of reflected
appraisal offered by James, Cooley, and Mead have largely withstood decades of scientific
scrutiny. Nonetheless, although consensus on the big picture of reflected appraisal has remained
fairly stable, the complex details of reflected appraisal processes are now far better understood.
The nature and direction of numerous biases common to reflected appraisal have been isolated,
as have relevant individual differences in the people viewing their reflection and in those serving
as mirrors. It will be interesting to learn whether some of the established principles of reflected
appraisal processes will need to be revised when researchers catch up to the recent revolutionary
changes in the tools people use to appraise themselves and others.
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Figure Caption

Figure 1. Components of reflected appraisal.
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Footnotes

1

Reflected appraisal is typically framed as a subcomponent or manifestation of symbolic

interactionism, but the terms are sometimes used interchangeably.
2

Scholars have rarely focused on distinctions between cognitive and emotional

dimensions of reflected appraisal; this chapter likewise infers both dimensions in referring to
views, judgments, and appraisals of and by self and others.
3

Some authors have used the reflected appraisal label narrowly to refer to

metaperception; our broader conceptualization of reflected appraisal encompasses both
metaperception and the self-appraisals that influence and result from metaperception.
4

One might question how self-views could be changed by metaperceptions if the

metaperceptions were based on self-views. In this case, concluding that others share one's views
of self should change self-views by strengthening the confidence with which they are held.
5

As Murray et al. (1998) noted, if low self-esteem is indeed a symptom of not feeling

socially accepted, it is sadly ironic that low self-esteem individuals have such difficulty
accepting the validity of others' expressions of acceptance.
6

The terms "self-stereotyping" or "metastereotyping" are sometimes used to describe

cases of reflected appraisal in which people judge themselves in accordance with the stereotypes
they associate with the group(s) to which they belong.
7

Some early research on the psychological consequences of internet use—before internet

use became mainstream behavior—suggested that the socially skilled benefit more from the
internet than the socially inept (e.g., Kraut et al., 1998), but the opposite pattern has typically
been found in more recent research.

